By Jorge Dastis
Washington, (EFE).- Since the war in Ukraine began, the United States has responded to Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s constant nuclear threats with the same phrase: “We do not see an imminent danger of a nuclear attack.”
The moderation contrasts with the urgency of the Kremlin’s crackdowns and is based, according to experts consulted by EFE, on extensive intelligence analysis and on the study of the terrain by satellite.
But with the apparent collapse of the latest atomic arms control treaty between the powers – New START, which forces Washington and Moscow to share information about the number and location of their nuclear warheads – the margin of error only grows. grow.
“USA. it still has intelligence capabilities to help them understand what Russia has and is doing, in terms of nuclear weapons,” explains Emma Claire Foley, an analyst at Global Zero, a group that fights for the abolition of atomic weapons.
However, the expert warns that, as time passes, this deliberate rejection of transparency will create “increasing room for uncertainty and for assuming the worst.”
After the end of START, how does the US measure the risk of a nuclear attack?
A clue about Washington’s ability to assess the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons can be sensed in the constant clarifications made by the US government every time Putin threatens to use them in Ukraine.
After The New York Times newspaper published a story in November of alleged conversations between Russian generals about the use of atomic weapons, John Kirby, one of the White House spokesmen, assured that “there are no signs that Russia is is preparing” to use this type of weapon.
The message was recently repeated, in statements to EFE, by a Defense Department official, who added that the United States has “a variety of ways to monitor Russia’s war in Ukraine”, but without going into more detail for “reasons of operational security”.
“If it were seen that the mobile missiles were starting to leave their garages, or that the bombers were making more flights than normal, that would be a sign that the Russians are preparing to attack,” clarifies, for his part, the former head of verification of the International Atomic Energy Agency Tariq Rauf.
Rauf explains that, to this day, even the civilian population can be aware of the position and status of Russian silos, missiles and launch systems through images taken by commercial satellites.
So as long as the Kremlin’s nuclear forces remain on the same alert level and the US sees no missile movements, Washington will continue to say they are concerned but see no indication of an imminent attack, he adds.
a matter of rhetoric
The position of the missiles and the movement of the bombers is not the only thing that gives the US authorities an idea of the nuclear risk in Ukraine; rhetoric is also important.
According to Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (ACA), when the story of Russian generals discussing the possibility of using atomic weapons broke, many in the US government changed their assessment of the risk of a nuclear attack.
“Since then there has been a significant diplomatic rejection of Putin’s nuclear threats, not only by the US, but by Chinese officials and (Chinese President) Xi Jingping himself,” says the expert, to the point of that Putin himself denied in December that he intended to use them.
For Kimball, the possibility that New START stops working – for the moment Russia has only canceled its participation in the verification regime, but will continue to respect the warhead limit – does not create so much a threat of use, but rather that the arsenals of the two powers cease to be constrained.
This would increase the risk of miscalculation in the event of an accident or if Russia decides to use a limited nuclear attack on Ukraine when faced with the prospect of defeat.
An uncertain future
For the three experts, the fragmentation of the New START further reduces the possibility of the US and Russia agreeing on the development of a new pact to replace it. Beyond compliance by the Russians, the treaty expires in 2026.
Kimball says he has had talks with “very high-ranking” officials in the Biden Administration who are very committed to returning Russia to New START and negotiating limits on nuclear arsenals.
But political instability in the United States, and the unpredictability of the war in Ukraine, make it difficult to think of a formal agreement.
The three experts believe, however, that informal compromises could be reached between leaders that allow them to continue maintaining a minimum window for de-escalation.
The alternative, they warn, is to progressively blind ourselves.
